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The Problem of Averting Global Catastrophe
Scott Barrett*
I think the odds are no better than fifty-fifty that our present civilization on
Earth will survive to the end of the present century. Our choices and
actions could ensure the perpetual future of life (not just on Earth, but
perhaps far beyond it, too). Or in contrast, through malign intent, or
through misadventure, twenty-first century technology could jeopardise
life's potential, foreclosing its human and post-human future. What happens
here on Earth, in this century, could conceivably make the difference

between a near eternity filled with ever more complex and subtle forms of
life and one filled with nothing but base matter.'

If there is a more alarming paragraph in non-fiction, written by someone of
Martin Rees's stature, I have not read it. \What makes Rees's words disturbing is
not just the opening prediction; it is the sentences that follow. These explain that
our prospects depend on the choices we make or decline to make, the actions we
take or fail to take. That we could avert a global catastrophe, and yet fail to do
so-that to me is what makes Rees's words so chilling.
How could this happen? Richard Posner, in his equally unsettling book,
Catastrophe, explains that the reasons are cultural, psychological, and economic.2
He is right, but a sparser explanation is possible, and may be more helpful; this is
to see that the fundamental problem is with our institutions. "Institutions,"
according to Douglass North, "are the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." 3
Institutions exist partly to correct the kinds of behaviors highlighted by
Posner-behaviors that ordinarily cause us annoyance and hardship at various

1

Professor and Director of International Policy, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University and Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Center for the Study of Globalization,
Yale University. In thinking about these issues, I have benefited from discussions with a number
of people, but especially David Fidler, Francis Fukuyama, and Thomas Schelling. Thomas
Schelling also provided comments on an earlier draft.
Martin Rees, Our Final Hour A Sdentist's Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster
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Threaten Humankind's Future in this Centur--OnEarth and Beyond 8 (Basic Books 2003).
Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response ch 2 (Oxford 2004).
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Douglass C. North, Institutions,InstitutionalChange and Economic Pejrormance3 (Cambridge 1990).
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levels but that could lead to our collective peril in the special circumstances
examined by Rees and Posner. As these catastrophes are global in scale, it is our
international institutions that matter most, and that will ultimately determine our
fate.
This is worrying, for international institutions are notoriously weak. The
principle of sovereignty, underpinning interactions among two hundred or so
states, is tolerable when the choices states make have only local consequences. It
is less so when, as Posner recognizes, the consequences are global and
potentially catastrophic. Indeed, Posner's recommendations for institutional
reform include the creation of an "international environmental protection
agency" with autonomous enforcement powers. Posner admits that such an
agency "would involve a significant surrender of sovereign powers on the part of
the nations of the world-which is probably why there is no such agency." 4 But
he believes that "there may be no feasible alternative means of curbing highly
destructive global negative externalities." 5 This is an uncomfortable admission; it
means that the institutions we need to avert a catastrophe may not be available.
Indeed, they may not even be attainable. In the longer term, of course, this
situation may change. The concept of sovereignty might be modified or even
abandoned, and the world reorganized. But such a drastic transformation will
not happen now or in the near future, and perhaps not even in this century, the
time frame of concern to Rees. The immediate challenge is thus to devise
institutions that can prevent or avert global catastrophes, even subject to these
limitations. In this Article, I want to suggest how we might do this, and explain
when this task is likely to be easy or difficult.
I.

WHAT IS A "GLOBAL CATASTROPHE"?

To Posner, a catastrophe is "an event that is believed to have a very low
probability of materializing but that if it does materialize will produce a harm so
great and sudden as to seem discontinuous with the flow of events that preceded
it."6 In their books, Posner and Rees pay particular attention to events that
threaten the survival of the human race. These are plainlyglobal catastrophes, and
are, for obvious reasons, of special interest. But lesser events are also deserving
of attention, particularly because they are more likely to occur.
Collision of the Earth with an asteroid ten kilometers or greater in diameter
would cause the extinction of most life forms, including humans, and would
thus kill about six billion people immediately or soon after impact. (The

4

Posner, Catastropheat 216 (cited in note 2).
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Id.
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Id at 6.
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extinction of the dinosaurs coincided with the Earth being hit by a ten kilometer
wide asteroid sixty-five million years ago.) However, if an asteroid one kilometer
in diameter were to crash into the Earth, "only" 1.5 billion people might die.'
The former collision is plainly the more serious; it would kill more people upon
impact and cause human extinction (thereby depriving potential future
generations of their lives). But the smaller kind of collision is more likely; it can
be expected to occur once every five hundred thousand years, whereas the
cataclysmic collision is likely to occur only once every one hundred million
years.' Considering these probabilities, which is the more serious risk? The
United Kingdom's Task Force on Potentially Hazardous Near Earth Objects
argues that collisions between the Earth and the smaller objects are, on average,
"the most dangerous because they are more frequent than [collisions between
the Earth and] the objects of the 10 kilometre class." 9 This suggests that the
emphasis that Posner and Rees give to extinction-causing catastrophes may be
misplaced.
Actually, determining which kind of risk is the more important one is far
from a straightforward exercise; the prospect of extinction raises profound
challenges to the analysis of risk.' ° Fortunately, however, there is little to be
gained by ranking these kinds of risks. Policy analysts need to evaluate both
Report of the Task Force on Potentialy HazardousNear Earth Objects 20 (Sept 2000), available online at
<http://www.nearearthobjects.co.uk/report/resources-task-intro.cfm> (visited Oct 7, 2005).
8

Id.

9

Id at 21.
One reason for this is the difficulty of comparing the loss of 1.5 billion lives with the loss of 6
billion that would occur upon impact-and the resulting human extinction. (Taking account of the
broader impacts for life on Earth would complicate matters even more.) Simple arithmetic will
not answer this question, but it can provide some illumination. Assume that the marginal value of
a loss of life is the same, irrespective of the total number of lives lost. Now, consider two extreme
assumptions about the additional value of extinction (that is, reducing the human population
below the minimum viable level). First, assume that this value is zero. Then, since collision with
the smaller asteroid is two hundred times more likely, but kills only one-quarter as many people, it
is plainly the greater risk. Collision with a smaller asteroid can expect to kill three thousand people
a year while collision with a larger asteroid can expect to kill only sixty people a year. This again
assumes a zero value to extinction. Now take the opposite view. Assume that the value of
extinction is infinite. Then, plainly, collision with the larger asteroid is the greater risk. As Graham
Allison says in his review of Posner's book in the Washington Post, "[slince a species-extinguishing
event like Earth colliding with a huge asteroid would be infinitely bad, even the slightest
probability of such an event occurring would swamp any cost-benefit calculation." Graham
Allison, Worst Case Scenarios, Wash Post T5 (Jan 9, 2005). Now, finally, ask the question of how
many people would need to lose their lives (including the potential lives lost as a consequence of
extinction) for the risks to be equivalent? Since the smaller asteroid collision is two hundred times
more likely, two hundred times as many people would need to lose their lives from a cataclysmic
collision for the risks to be comparable under these simple assumptions: three hundred billion
people. This value is in between the two extremes just considered of zero and infinity, but is it too
high or too low? The answer (at least to me) is not obvious.

10
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types-as Rees and Posner do in their books. 1' Policy analysts also need to
consider catastrophes defined in terms other than human mortality. It is not just
survival that matters, but the nature of human existence.
1I. AVERTING "MINOR" CATASTROPHES: A LOOK BACKWARDS
Since our species has never suffered a catastrophe substantial enough to
cause our extinction, we have no experience to draw from as regards
institutional failure on this scale. "Minor" catastrophes, however, offer a useful
reference point. Here we have observed failure-the recent Asian tsunami being
an obvious example.
As pointed out in a Nature editorial published soon after the tsunami struck
in late 2004, a tsunami warning system existed in the Pacific Ocean but not in
the Indian Ocean. Why? According to the editorial, "the most important
differentiating factor" was "the readiness of 'Pacific rim' nations such as Japan,
Australia and the United States to support a cheap but potentially effective2
system for monitoring and for educating the public about an infrequent risk.'
By contrast, the countries that could have benefited from an early warning
system in the Indian Ocean were "relatively poor countries with needs that
seemed more pressing than that of planning against the remote-but
nonetheless inevitable-prospect of a tsunami."' 3 In short, richer countries had
more to lose from a tsunami in economic terms, and were thus willing to pay for
a warning system. This is not to say that the decision to forego development of a
warning system for the Indian Ocean was sensible, even from an ex ante
perspective (looking back, it was obviously disastrous). However, we should not
be surprised that a warning system was developed for the one ocean but not the
other. The incentives to avert a catastrophe differed in each setting.
Of course, it might also be asked, as the Nature editorial did, why the
wealthier countries did not help finance a warning system for the Indian
Ocean. 14 But the answer here would be the same: the richer countries had little
incentive to do so.' 5 Indeed, the answer to the question of why countries like the
US have failed to intervene to prevent genocides-perhaps the worst kind of
"minor" catastrophe, if it is permissible to use that adjective in this context-is
11
12
13
14

15

See generally Rees, Our FinalHour(cited in note 1); Posner, Catastrophe(cited in note 2).
Opinion, A Divided World, 433 Nature 1 (Jan 6, 2005).
Id.
Specifically, the editorial asks, "Is it too much to expect that people in rich countries, when
confronted with evidence on such a scale, will ask that their governments start to pay modest
respect to the value of human life amongst the poor, and adjust their budgetary priorities
accordingly?" Id.
See generally Posner, Catastropheat ch 2 (cited in note 2).
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the same. "Because America's 'vital national interests' were not considered
imperiled by mere genocide," Samantha Power explains, "senior U.S. officials
did not give genocide the moral attention it warranted."' 6 Institutions, both
formal and informal, were unable to overcome this incentive problem. The
Rwanda genocide took place long after the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 7 had entered into force, and long after
Western culture had sworn that genocide would never be allowed to happen
again. Institutions were of no help to the Tutsi of Rwanda.
From this perspective, our institutions should be better at averting global
catastrophes. Since every country would be affected by a global catastrophe,
each has some incentive to reduce the risk of the catastrophe's occurrence. But
will that incentive be enough? As we shall see, it probably will be under some
circumstances. It will not be under others.
III. AVERTING "MAJOR" CATASTROPHES: ANOTHER LOOK
BACKWARDS
We have, of course, succeeded in avoiding global catastrophe. Can
anything be learned from this history?
In some cases, we have nothing to learn, only an outcome to be grateful
for. In the 125,000 or so years since Homo sapiens evolved, the Earth might have
been struck by an asteroid big enough to have caused our extinction, before we
could develop a technology capable of offering protection. That this failed to
happen was simply a matter of luck.
The Cold War, and the possibility of a nuclear exchange between the
superpowers, was different. As Rees explains, the probability of nuclear war was
substantial. 8 Nuclear war was avoided partly by luck, and partly because
institutions helped in reducing risk. In this case, history does have something to
teach us.' 9
One such institution was the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5 of which
declared that "an armed attack against one or more" of its signatory countries

16

Samantha Power, 'A Problem From Hell":America and the Age of Genocide 504 (Basic Books 2002).

17

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), 78 UN Treaty

18

Set 278 (1951).
Rees, Our FinalHour at 8 (cited in note 1).

19

Nuclear war and a nuclear stand-off were not the only possible outcomes. Conventional war was
also possible, but the prospect of conventional war was made less likely by the nuclear option.
Whether avoiding a conventional war was worth the risk of nuclear war is perhaps a hard
question to answer, but there is a more general point-that decisions of the kind relevant to this
paper often involve risk-risk trade-offs. See also Section VI.
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"shall be considered an attack against them all.' 2 ° This pledged the US to
intervene, should the Soviet Union invade Western Europe-a written
commitment made credible by the stationing of US forces in Europe. In helping
to deter a Soviet attack, the North Atlantic Treaty reassured Western Europe of
its security, making acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries such as West
Germany unnecessary; and in doing this, it reduced nuclear weapons
proliferation and thus the concomitant risk of nuclear catastrophe."'
Other formal institutions also helped quell the tense Cold War situation,
perhaps the most important being the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
("NPT").2 2 To be sure, the NPT is an imperfect agreement. Today, not every
country is a member (India and Pakistan are notable non-signatories), and those
that are can withdraw when doing so suits their interests (North Korea withdrew
in 2003). Member countries can also fail to comply, with minimal adverse
consequences, when compliance is difficult to monitor, verify, or enforce. (iran
recently announced that it would restart its uranium enrichment and processing
activities and Abdul Qadir Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's nuclear
program, admitted selling nuclear technology to third-party governments,
supposedly without official backing.) But, for all these weaknesses, proliferation
on a wide scale has (so far) been prevented, and the NPT deserves partial credit
for this accomplishment. Though the glass of nonproliferation is not quite full, it
is not quite empty, either.
Also important is the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used over the
last sixty years, even when their use would have been militariy advantageous-thatis, even
when a nuclear state's opponent possessed only conventional weapons. As
explained by Thomas Schelling, the reason is not that the use of nuclear
weapons is prohibited by international law. It is that a norm prohibiting their
use-what Schelling calls a "taboo"--deterred countries from using them.
Deviation from this norm by just one country would condone use of such
weapons by others-an act that would make every state less secure, including
the country that broke the taboo. 3 It would also invite such a hostile reaction by

20

North Atlantic Treaty (1949), art 5, 63 Stat 2241, 2244.

21

Ironically, Article 5 was only triggered after the end of the Cold War (it was a Cold War
construction), and following an attack (it was meant to deter an attack) against the United States
(it was intended to protect Europe) by just nineteen hijackers (not army divisions), acting on
behalf of a stateless al Qaeda terrorist network (it was meant to prevent war between states). The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's involvement in Afghanistan followed the US-led invasion
and toppling of the Taliban regime, which had harbored the al Qaeda leadership.

22

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 UN Treaty Ser 169 (1970).

23

Thomas C. Schelling, The Legagy of Hiroshima:A Half-Century Without Nuclear War, 65 Key Reporter
(Spring 2000), available online at
Schelling.htm> (visited Oct 7, 2005).

<http://www.pbk.org/pubs/Keyreporter/Spring2000/
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the rest of the world as to isolate the country diplomatically, perhaps even to the
point where the country's sovereignty ceased to be recognized.
A fear expressed by Rees is that the development of destructive
technologies, if left unchecked, could precipitate a catastrophe. Schelling's
analysis explains that the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has
succeeded (thus far) partly by making states reluctant to develop new,
destructive technologies-weapons that could skirt the taboo. An example is the
"neutron bomb," which was designed to kill people but not to destroy property.
A state might have gained a military advantage by possessing such a bomb, but it
was never developed. One reason is that the bomb would have blurred the
distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. Another reason is that
there would have been a temptation to use this weapon, as compared with the
strategic nuclear arsenal. For both these reasons, the neutron bomb would have
placed the nuclear taboo in jeopardy; it would have made the US less, not more,
24

secure.

So, institutions, both formal and informal, have helped to avert
catastrophes in the past. Can they be relied upon to do so in the future? As I
explained previously, every country has some incentive to prevent a global
catastrophe. However, this observation should not make us complacent, for
there is no automatic mechanism that creates, sustains, and makes effective
institutions of the kind that are needed. History offers us lessons, not
reassurances.
The nuclear taboo, for example, is a fragile institution. The administration
of US President George W. Bush recently proposed developing a "bunker
busting" nuclear weapon capable of destroying targets buried deep
underground-a weapon that a National Academy of Sciences report finds
"cannot penetrate to depths required for total containment of the effects of a
nuclear explosion., 25 In other words, if used, this weapon would cause massive
loss of life. Of course, this is true of all nuclear weapons, but the reason for
developing this one is specifically so that it can be used. Even the public
declaration of an interest in such a weapon is destabilizing, for such a statement
endangers the nuclear taboo.
Nonproliferation incentives are also delicate. For example, the stated aim
of "regime change" only succeeds in giving targeted regimes an incentive to
acquire nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterring attacks. It is not by
coincidence that Iran and North Korea-the two members of the "Axis of Evil"
24

Id.

25

Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons Division on
Engineering and Physical Sciences, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetratorand Other Weapons 2 (Nad
Academies 2005).
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that have thus far escaped attack-have been bolstering their nuclear programs.
Iraq, the third member of the so-called axis, was attacked partly because it did
not possess a nuclear deterrent.
In the following three sections I consider three other potential sources of
catastrophe, each reflecting a different kind of incentive problem and thus a
different challenge to institutional design.
IV. AVERTING AN ASTEROID COLLISION: A BEST SHOT
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD
Space is replete with objects. Most are the size of pebbles, but some,
including comets and asteroids, are very large. The first asteroid ever discovered,
Ceres, is the largest asteroid known to exist: nearly one thousand kilometers in
diameter. Asteroids (sometimes called small planets) were formed at the same
time as the Earth, and like the Earth and the other planets in our solar system,
they orbit the sun. Some asteroids have orbits that pass near the Earth's path;
these are called "near-Earth objects." Near-Earth objects have struck the Earth
in the past, and they will continue to do so in the future.
The last significant collision occurred in 1908, when an asteroid fifty to
seventy meters in diameter exploded upon hitting the atmosphere over Siberia's
Tunguska valley, devastating an area the size of Manhattan. Collisions with
asteroids of this size are relatively frequent; the probability of another such
encounter this century is estimated to be about 10 percent.26 As explained
previously, asteroids one kilometer or more in diameter are of particular
concern; so far, almost eight hundred of these have been identified.27 Though a
collision between the Earth and a near-Earth object of this size is unlikely in any
given year, over longer periods of time, the probability of an impact can be
significant: "there is a8 chance of perhaps one in 5,000 that such a strike will
2
occur in this century.,

On December 26, 2001, NASA identified an asteroid about three hundred
meters across that was heading toward the Earth. The asteroid, named 2001
YB5, was traveling about 68,000 miles per hour relative to the Earth, and it
passed by just a few days after being spotted, approaching as close as a distance
about twice that of the Earth from the moon. Had it struck the Earth, this
relatively small asteroid would have created "one of the worst disasters in human
26

27

28

Andrea Milani, Extraterrestnal Material--Virtual or Real Hazards? 300 Science 1882-83 (2003);
Schweickart, et al, The Asteroid Tugboat, 289 Scientific Am 54-61 (Nov 2003).
NearEarth Object Program,NASA Minor Planetary Center, available online at <http://neo.jpl.nasa.
gov/neo/number.htm> (visited Oct 7, 2005). The list is updated daily.
Schweickart, 289 Scientific Am at 56 (cited in note 26). For other estimates, and a more
comprehensive treatment, see Posner, Catastrophe at 24-29 (cited in note 2).
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history," according to a representative of NASA's Near Earth Asteroid Tracking
program. What could we have done about it? "The answer," this same expert
explained, "is not much."29
In the future, we could do more. If we were able to identify large asteroids
earlier, and chart their orbit, we could predict the time and location of impact,
allowing people in the vicinity of a collision to be moved to safety. This is why
an investment in locating and tracking asteroids is critically important, even
given our existing technology. Creating an asteroid tracking system would be
akin to developing a tsunami early warning system, only on a global scale.
Damage from asteroids large enough to cause human extinction can only
be mitigated by deflecting the asteroids away from a collision course with the
Earth. Of course, this technology would also be useful when applied to more
moderate sized asteroids. Developing the capability to deflect asteroids would
thus be dually advantageous.
Several options are currently being investigated, including the launch of a
''space tug" that would attach itself to an approaching asteroid and push the
asteroid away from a collision course with the Earth.3 ° (If the asteroid were
distant enough, a slight nudge would be sufficient.) This possibility is not
confined to the realm of science fiction. In 2001, NASA's NEAR Shoemaker
spacecraft landed gently on the surface of Eros, an asteroid 196 million miles
from the Earth, even though the spacecraft was not designed for this purpose.3'
More recently, on July 4, 2005, NASA's Deep Impact spacecraft launched an
"impactor" spacecraft that successfully collided with Comet Tempel 1. This
impactor was not forceful enough to appreciably change the comet's orbit, but a
larger device, designed specifically for this purpose, could.32
Protection of the Earth from asteroids is a global public good. No country
could be excluded from the benefit of protection, and one country's
consumption of that protection would not diminish the amount available to
others. More specifically, asteroid defense is a "best shot" public good; only one
(successful) intervention is needed to supply the public good.3 3 Asteroid defense

29

See Large Asteroid Passes Close to Earth, AP (Jan 8, 2002), available online at <http://neat.jpl.nasa.

30

gov/2001YB5.htm> (visited Oct 7, 2005).
See Schweickart, 289 Scientific Am at 54-61 (cited in note 26).

31

32

See NEAR Shoemaker Makes Historic Touchdown on Asteroid Eros, JHU Applied Physics Laboratory
(Feb 12, 2001), available online at <http://www.jhuapl.edu/newscenter/pressreleases/2001/
010212.htm> (visited Oct 7, 2005).
See Deep Impact Daiy Update, NASA, available online at <http://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/
deepimpact/main/index.html> (visited Oct 7, 2005).

33

The classifications given here were devised by Jack Hirshleifer. See Jack Hirshleifer, From WeakestLink to Best-Shot: The Voluntagy Provision of Pubic Goods, 41 Pub Choice 371, 372 (1983). Also see
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is thus analogous to eliminating a global pandemic at the source, before it has
had the chance to spread. It is to be contrasted with other global public goods,
like ozone layer protection, the provision of which depends on the aggregate
effort of a large number of countries (a "summation" global public good), or
disease eradication, which requires the participation of every country (a "weakest
link" global public good).
Should the world supply the global public good of asteroid protection? As
noted by Schweickart, "An asteroid collision with Earth would be so potentially
devastating that preventing it would be worth almost any cost. '3 4 Of course, this
assumes that the collision would occur with certainty if actions were not taken to
avert it. But if we were able to identify and track all asteroids, and spotted a very
large one heading toward the Earth, then this is precisely the situation we would
face. In this case, because human survival would depend on success, it would
pay to devote any amount of resources to protection.
The calculus would be different as regards small asteroids, or measures that
would reduce the risk of a large asteroid hitting the Earth. In these cases, the
expected benefits of providing the global public good of asteroid protection
would be finite, and to know whether the investment would be worth making
would require comparing this benefit with the associated cost. Schweickart and
his coauthors suggest that a space tug would cost about $1 billion.35 According
to Milani, a catastrophic collision would cause the equivalent of about one
thousand expected deaths a year.36 Avoiding such a collision would therefore
save about one thousand lives a year. Very crudely, investment in the tug would
be worthwhile if the benefit in lives saved exceeded the tug's cost. To make a
comparison, this benefit needs to be expressed in dollar terms. Moreover, since
the benefit would not be realized until some time in the future, it needs to be
discounted to a "present value." Denote the benefit per life saved by b and
assume that the discount rate is 3 percent (the qualitative results are not sensitive
to this choice).7 It can then be shown that the investment is worthwhile

generally Todd Sandier, Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic
Problems (Cambridge 1997).
34

Schweickart, 289 Scientific Am at 61 (cited in note 26).

35

Id.
Milani, ExtraterrestrialMaterial-Virtualor Real Hazards at 1882 (cited in note 26). Posner cites a
somewhat higher estimate of 1,479 deaths per year. See Posner, Catastropheat 29 (cited in note 2).

36

37

Choice of a discount rate, particularly for such a decision such as this, is non-trivial from several
perspectives. Some of the difficulties are discussed by Posner, Catastropheat 150-55 (cited in note
2). For a more technical but also penetrating treatment, see Partha Dasgupta, Human Well-Being
and the NaturalEnironmentch 6 (Oxford 2001).
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provided b > $30,000.38 The benefit of a life saved can be approximated by the
value of a statistical life-the value implicit in the choices individuals make
routinely in trading off increased risk for increased money payments. The value
of a statistical life even for poor countries substantially exceeds this value, and so
we can conclude that asteroid protection is a sound global investment.3 9 This is a
global public good that should be provided.
But can we expect that this public good will be provided? Or will free
riding undermine global provision of asteroid protection? The US would likely
have the greatest incentive to provide this public good since it would, in absolute
terms, bear the greatest loss from an asteroid collision. Indeed, it is easy to
demonstrate that the economics of asteroid protection are so attractive that it
would be beneficial for the US to finance the entire protection program. 40 Since
it pays the US to supply the public good unilaterally, theory suggests that the
good will be supplied. As it happens, behavior is consistent with this prediction.
The US is already "doing more about Near Earth Objects than the rest of the
world put together."'" For example, the US has already funded a program to
track large objects in space, a prerequisite for further action. (Fortunately, the
nature of asteroid travel means that we should have decades, if not centuries, to
prepare for a possible collision; however, comets with long-period orbits cannot
be observed as easily, and these are thus particularly dangerous.)

38

If society is risk neutral, the investment is worthwhile if the upfront cost of the investment ($1
billion) is less than the present value benefit. Assuming that the tug would save one thousand lives
a year, at a value per life of b, and taking the discount rate to be 3 percent, the present value of
future benefits would be approximately equal to 1,000 X b/0.03. The investment would be
worthwhile if this present value estimate exceeded the cost, implying the condition b > $30,000.

39

For estimates of the value of a statistical life in different countries, see generally Kip W. Viscusi
and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a StatisticalLife: A CriticalReview of Market Estimates throughout the
World, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5 (2003). Estimates for India cited by Viscusi and Aldy range from
$1 million to $4 million. The lowest value cited in their paper is for Taiwan: $200,000. Based on
these estimates, we can safely conclude that the mean value for all persons in the world exceeds
$30,000.
Suppose that each person on Earth has an equal chance of dying from an asteroid collision. The

40

US share of the global population is about 4.7 percent. Since the tug is estimated to prevent the
loss of about one thousand lives per year, this means that it could be expected to save about
forty-seven US lives a year. The value of a statistical life for the US is between $4 and $9 million.
See id at 53-54. Taking the lower value, the annual benefit of avoiding an asteroid collision would
be about $188 million. Using a discount rate of 3 percent, the present value of all future avoided
deaths would thus be $188 million/0.03 = $6.3 billion. Since the cost of a space tug is just $1
billion, even the US acting alone would have an incentive to supply the asteroid protection.
41

Report of the Task Force on Potentialy HazardousNear Earth Objects at 24 (cited in note 7).
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What theory cannot predict is how the public good of asteroid defense will
be financed. It could be financed entirely by the US, but it could also be
financed via any number of other burden-sharing arrangements.42
To illustrate this point, consider the financing of the 1991 Persian Gulf
War. Removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait was also a best shot, global public
good. It enforced the norm safeguarding a state's territorial sovereignty,
stabilized the global oil market, and invigorated the United Nations by carrying
out the threat expressed in Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized
the use of "all necessary means" to free Kuwait. 43 The US would have gained
substantially from restoring Kuwait's sovereignty, but so would all other
countries. Thus, while the US led the coalition against Iraq, many countries
contributed, both financially and in kind. According to a Department of Defense
study, foreign governments funded almost 90 percent of the military effort.'
Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger claim that other countries paid because the US
would not have intervened without allied contributions. 45 However, assuming
that was not the case-meaning that the US was willing to intervene
unilaterally-other countries would likely have contributed anyway. The US
would have wanted to share the burden and other countries would have
recognized their obligation to pay their fair share.
Is US leadership in asteroid defense enough? Posner believes it is not. "The
problem is not free riding," he says, "it is that asteroids are not yet perceived to
be a significant enemy."46 If US perceptions about its own interests were wrong,
or if domestic political economy failures prevented the US from supplying this
global public good, then US leadership plainly would not suffice. Indeed, the
Task Force on Potentially Hazardous Near Earth Objects, established by the
British Government, concluded that the world should do more. To the Task
Force, asteroid defense is a global problem requiring an international response.
The United States's strong unilateral incentive to protect the Earth from
asteroids makes provision of this global public good relatively easy. However,
the rest of the world should not complacently rely on the US to act in its best
42
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interest. Since the consequences of the actions that are taken or not taken will be
shared, the responsibility for deciding which actions to take or not take should
also be shared.
There are two possible futures. In one, the United States would take the
lead, but other countries would contribute materially to a joint effort, and share
in the decision-making (an arrangement akin to the International Space Station).
In the other, countries with strong incentives to supply this global public good
unilaterally would develop initiatives of their own. The latter outcome is already
developing. The European Space Agency, for example, is planning to deploy a
spacecraft intended to alter an asteroid's orbit.4"
The Task Force recommends establishing an Intergovernmental Panel on
Threats from Space, modeled after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, to assess the science, the impacts, and the mitigation possibilities.4 8 This
is a sensible proposal, as it would provide a common basis from which to
develop an institution for coordinating a global response. A treaty on near-Earth
objects would need to establish the objectives of international cooperation in
this area, as well as provide the bases for decision-making and burden-sharing.
Because of the incentive structure underlying asteroid defense, this would
probably be a relatively easy treaty to negotiate, enforce, and sustain over time.
V. AVERTING DANGEROUS SCIENCE: A WEAKEST LINK
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD
Scientific inquiry sometimes poses risks. Indeed, one of the striking
arguments advanced by Rees, a cosmologist, is that science, if weakly supervised,
may precipitate a global catastrophe. An arresting example given by Rees is the
probability-remote but non-zero--that a particle accelerator could produce a
strangelet capable of transforming "the entire planet Earth into an inert
hyperdense sphere about one hundred meters across. ' 49 Posner examines the
merits of research that uses this technology and finds that the accelerator
managed by the Brookhaven National Laboratory would likely fail a cost-benefit
test, even leaving aside the risk of a catastrophic accident. More worryingly,
Posner observes that there is no regulatory oversight of the experiments being
conducted at Brookhaven."0 To be specific, there is no domestic oversight. There
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is, of course, no international oversight either, and yet the risks of a catastrophic
accident are being borne by the whole world. This situation is clearly
problematic.
Another category of risk posed by science-one that is discussed only
briefly by Rees and not at all by Posner-is of a very different kind: not the risk
of an unintended accident or the risk that science would purposefully be used to
harm people (bioterrorism being an example), but the risk that science,
developed for peaceful purposes, and used willingly by people for their own
betterment (at least as they perceive it), could set in motion a cascade of
behavior capable of triggering a catastrophe. Areas where this problem could
arise include the sciences of cloning and inheritable genetic modification.
There are two kinds of cloning. Therapeutic cloning uses stem cells from
cloned embryos to treat diseases while reproductive cloning creates genetically
identical individuals-that is, individuals having a single genetic parent. There is
broad agreement that reproductive cloning should be prohibited, but opinions
on the merits of therapeutic cloning vary-with the differences depending on
the values attached to human embryos (including embryos used for in vitro
fertilization, which will invariably be discarded) and the prospect of using this
technology to treat serious degenerative disorders like Parkinson's disease.
Negotiations for a treaty banning reproductive cloning collapsed in 2004 after
several countries, including the US, insisted that both forms of cloning be
banned, a position that was unacceptable to many other states."' As a
consequence of this failure, neither form of cloning is currently prohibited by
international law. In March 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a resolution approving the United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning,
which calls upon member states "to prohibit all forms of human cloning
inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of
human life."512 However, this resolution (approved by a vote of eighty-four
countries in favor and thirty-four against with thirty-seven abstentions) is nonbinding, and it will have no practical import.5 3
The related science of inheritable genetic modification ("IGM") refers to a
biomedical intervention that modifies the genome that a person passes on to his
or her offspring. 1GM could potentially prevent inherited diseases from being
transmitted to future generations, including diseases that could not be avoided
or treated by other means. If used on a large scale, and over a long period of
time, IGM could even decrease the incidence of certain inherited diseases in the
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human gene pool. IGM could also be used to "enhance" normal human
characteristics-to create "designer babies" who would grow up to be
extraordinarily tall or, perhaps, exceptionally intelligent.
A decision to use IGM for enhancement purposes may seem wholly
private, but such a choice would have social consequences. Genetic
enhancements would advantage some people in the marketplace, and might thus
prompt a kind of bandwagon effect: as more parents used IGM, the incentive
for others to use it might increase. This situation is obviously analogous to the
use of body-enhancing drugs in sports. Another relevant current example
involves the widespread use of the drug Ritalin in the US. Ritalin can be used for
therapeutic purposes, but it can also be used to modify behavior-to help a
54
child concentrate and thereby improve his or her performance in school. Of
course, the major difference between these examples and IGM is that the effects
of IGM would be passed to future generations.
Dark scenarios are conceivable. George Annas, Lori Andrews, and Rosario
Isasi speculate that if the science of biotechnology is unrestrained and used to
create "better" children, "a new species or subspecies of humans will emerge.""
This
new species, or "posthuman," will likely view the old "normal" humans as
inferior, even savages, and fit for slavery or slaughter. The normals, on the
other hand, may see the posthumans as a threat and if they can, may engage
in a preemptive strike by killing the posthumans before they themselves are
killed or enslaved by them. It is ultimately this predictable potential for
genocide that makes species-altering experiments potential weapons of mass
destruction, and makes the unaccountable genetic engineer a potential
bioterrorist. It is also why cloning and genetic modification is of species56
wide concern and why an international treaty to address it is appropriate.
A different catastrophe scenario seems more likely-not one counted in
deaths, but in fundamental changes in what it means to be human. "[W]hat is at
stake," argues Roberto Andorno, "is nothing less than the preservation of the
identity of the human species.""7
IGM could also widen-or narrow-social inequalities. A report for the
American Association for the Advancement of Science ("AAAS") concluded
that use of IGM for enhancement purposes "could widen the gap between the
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'haves' and the 'have nots' to an unprecedented extent," with the rich being able
to afford IGM, and the poor not. 8 The opposite effect is also possible. Francis
Fukuyama thinks it just as likely that 1GM may tempt a democratic welfare state
to "reenter the eugenics game, intervening this time not to prevent low-IQ
people from breeding, but to help5' genetically
disadvantaged people raise their
9
IQs and the lQs of their offspring.
IGM's effects would not be confined to a state's borders. In a globalized
economy, the safeguards adopted by some countries may actually create
incentives for the science of IGM to move elsewhere-just as restrictions on
stem cell research by the US and other countries only shifted biomedical
investment towards countries with more liberal stem cell laws, such as Singapore
and South Korea. To some extent, this relocation of effort reflects different
attitudes to the risks posed by IGM research, but self-reinforcing tendencies may
also exist. Countries may be inclined to lower their restrictions on IGM in the
belief that if they do not, others will (a "race to the bottom"). Globalization may
also amplify this tendency: persons from any country could travel to the country
in which the most liberal IGM procedures are available. For both reasons, there
may exist a tendency for global standards to be shaped by the country that
undertakes the weakest safeguards. In the language of economics, restricting the
science of IGM is a weakest link public good.
How can catastrophes like the unregulated use of IGM and cloning be
averted? Annas, Andrews, and Isasi urge negotiation of a treaty banning
reproductive cloning and 1GM. 60 But reaching an accord on such a treaty would
be difficult-more difficult, certainly, than negotiating a treaty on asteroid
protection. The main reason for this difference is that participation in treaties is
voluntary, and a global ban on IGM and reproductive cloning would, unlike a
treaty on asteroid protection, require effective, near universal participation. The
experience of negotiating the ban on human cloning demonstrates how difficult
this can be.
How have other weakest link global public goods been supplied? A prime
example is disease eradication. 61 A disease can only be eradicated if it is
eliminated within every country. Elimination is costly, but if eradication occurs,
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every country will receive a huge windfall; each will no longer need to suffer
from or protect against infection. For many countries, it will pay to eliminate a
disease only if doing so will cause the disease to be eradicated worldwide. Hence,
the success of an eradication program depends in part on every country being
assured of the intention of all other states to eliminate the disease. This
assurance is typically given in resolutions adopted by the World Health
Assembly ("WHA"), a kind of legislative arm of the World Health Organization
("WHO"). WHA resolutions are not legally binding on WHO member states,
but the resolutions do not need to be obligatory under these special
conditions-they need only coordinate behavior.
WHA resolutions have denounced human reproductive cloning as being
"ethically unacceptable and contrary to human dignity and integrity., 62 Could
these resolutions also prescribe limits on IGM? Probably not. In the case of
eradication, the "last" country to eliminate the disease has a strong incentive to
carry out its pledge, namely the windfall noted earlier. But for 1GM, the
incentive structure is different. Even if all other countries can be relied upon to
restrict IGM, the "last" country may not want to follow suit, just as an individual
athlete may be tempted to use steroids even when assured that all others will
not.
Fukuyama proposes a different approach. He argues that international
governance in this area "can come about through the effort of nation-states to
harmonize their regulatory policies."63 As an example, Fukuyama cites efforts to
harmonize the drug approval process. However, this analogy is imperfect
because the motivation for establishing harmonized IGM standards differs from
the motivation for harmonizing the drug approval process, which is lowering
transactions costs all around. Furthermore, the need for 1GM regulation is not
only to reach a consensus, but to prevent countries from establishing their
regulatory policies independently.
I agree with Annas, Andrews, and Isasi that a treaty is needed, but the
weakest link nature of this problem requires very broad if not universal
agreement, and just as countries were unable to agree on a therapeutic cloning
ban, so are they unlikely to agree on a ban encompassing all forms of IGM (even
assuming that this would be collectively desirable). The kinds of IGM to be
permitted and proscribed will have to be negotiated, with the understanding that
the parties to such an agreement would remain free to establish more restrictive
regulations on their own. This would be akin to a treaty that only banned
62
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reproductive cloning but allowed parties individually to ban therapeutic cloning.
Negotiation of such a treaty would not be easy-according to the AAAS
working group, "there will be difficult borderline cases"-but it should
nevertheless be possible "to distinguish between 1GM applications for therapy
and enhancement."6 4 The ban would probably also need to be subject to a time
limit, and as science evolved, the negotiated restrictions would need to be
reconsidered.
Would such a weak agreement achieve anything? It may. If countries were
assured that other states would not carry out research in certain areas, then one
rationale for engaging in such research-the reasoning that if others are likely to
work in this area, then your country might as well, too-would be removed. The
normative power of the prohibition may also be influential, for deviation from
an ethical standard to which nearly all countries have subscribed would be a
significant step (a little like violation of the nuclear taboo). A few countries may
be tempted to deviate, but, as Fukuyama notes, this would not matter because
few people would want to utilize a technology that could only be obtained from
rogue states that had spurned ethical norms.6 5 Finally, the treaty could reinforce
these incentives by perhaps agreeing that biomedical knowledge would be shared
with other parties and by prohibiting parties from exporting technology and
expertise to non-parties.
VI. AVERTING ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE: A SUMMATION

GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD
Gases in the atmosphere called "greenhouse gases" trap heat radiated by
the sun. These gases, including water vapor and carbon dioxide ("C0 2"), occur
naturally; without them, the Earth's atmosphere would be about 34 degrees
Centigrade cooler than it is now, a temperature too cold to support life.
Industrialization has released CO 2 and other gases into the atmosphere,
increasing their concentration by about one-third, from 280 parts per million
("ppm") to 380 ppm. Concentrations are expected to continue rising in the
future, and a reasonable estimate is that by 2100, concentrations will be 90 to
350 percent greater than the pre-industrial level.66 Beyond 2100, they are
expected to be higher still.
What effect will rising CO 2 concentrations have? The basic physics is
simple: if there are more heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere, then more heat
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will be trapped and temperatures will rise. By what amount? That, it turns out, is
a much harder question to answer. Global mean temperature has already
increased about 0.6 degrees Centigrade since the late nineteenth century, though
it is difficult to determine precisely how much of this change is attributable to
the increase in atmospheric concentrations since climate changes often occur
naturally. We can currently only make educated guesses. The CO 2 concentration
is already higher than at any point in the past 650,000 years 6V-and probably in
the last twenty million years 6 8-so history offers few lessons. Worse, we cannot
run controlled experiments to determine how the Earth will respond to different
concentration levels-the best we can do is to simulate these responses on a
computer. Consensus estimates produced by this method predict that by 2100,
global mean temperature will rise 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Centigrade and the sea level
will rise 0.09 to 0.88 meters-the latter change resulting from thermal expansion
of the oceans as well as the melting of glaciers and ice caps. Of course, if
concentrations are not stabilized, the climate will change still more after 2100.
Even if concentrations were stabilized today, changes would continue for many
decades because of lags in the climate system.
The aforementioned analysis assumes "gradual warming." But we cannot
presume that climate change will actually be gradual. Although history cannot
tell us precisely how the system will respond to rising concentrations, we do
know that "abrupt climate changes have occurred repeatedly throughout the
geological record"69 and that they may occur again-this time, perhaps, triggered
by rising greenhouse gas concentrations. By this view, the climate is not a
simple, linear system, but a complex one characterized by feedbacks (positive
and negative) that can instigate non-linear responses.70 One oft-mentioned
change is a weakening or even collapse of the Gulf Stream,71 but other changes
are also possible. As noted in a report by the United States National Academy of
Sciences, "future abrupt changes cannot be predicted with confidence, and
climate surprises are to be expected. 72 This is important, because such changes
may be irreversible or only slowly reversible; it is possible for systems to "flip"
from one kind of state to another, and then to remain entrenched there.
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Abrupt climate change could precipitate a catastrophe. Such a change
would occur suddenly (in this context, probably over the course of one to three
decades), and it would be unexpected and substantial. This rapid transformation
would increase the costs of climate change as compared with a more gradual
process, assuming that the rate of change exceeded the rate of capital
depreciation. Natural systems, being slow to adapt, would likely be the most
seriously affected, but abrupt climate shifts may even cause more fundamental
changes. A study commissioned by the United States Department of Defense
has speculated that abrupt climate change could sharply reduce carrying capacity,
and, in doing so, trigger powerful, geopolitical reactions:
Nations with the resources to do so may build virtual fortresses around their
countries, preserving resources for themselves. Less fortunate nations
especially those with ancient enmities with their neighbors, may initiate in
struggles for access to food, clean water, or energy. Unlikely alliances could
is resources for survival
be formed as defense priorities shift and the goal
73
rather than religion, ideology, or national honor.
Less dramatic changes are more likely. Abrupt transformations in climate
would probably cause few deaths. Many scientists have remarked that climate
change would increase the spread of disease, 4 and seasonal weather changes are
associated with outbreaks of many diseases, including meningococcal meningitis
in sub-Saharan Africa and rotavirus in the US. Moreover, stronger El Nifio
events have been linked to the prevalence of cholera in Bangladesh, the spread
of Rift Valley fever in East Africa, and malaria incidences on the Indian
subcontinent. However, while the spread of disease is influenced by the weather,
the connection between global climate change and the spread of disease has not
yet been established." One point is clear: as Rees notes, "Not even76 the most
drastic conceivable climate shifts could directly destroy all humanity."
The first international agreement on climate change, the Framework
Convention on Climate Change of 1992, established a goal of stabilizing
"greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
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dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."77 The idea of a
"dangerous" level implies a threshold, as if concentrations below this level are
presumably "safe." Although not expressed in these terms, the Framework
Convention seems to have anticipated concerns about abrupt climate change
and is certainly consistent with this concept.
Support for this convention is almost unprecedented. Today, there are a
mere handful of non-parties: Andorra, Brunei, the Holy See, Iraq, and Somalia.
This agreement clearly does not suffer from free riding. It demonstrates a
consensus that "dangerous" interference with the climate system should be
avoided. But what level of concentration qualifies as dangerous? On this
question, a consensus is lacking.
The International Task Force on Climate Change, jointly chaired by
Stephen Byers, a Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom, and US Senator
Olympia Snowe, concluded that global mean temperature should not be allowed
to rise more than 2 degrees Centigrade (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above the preindustrial level-a level "associated with a CO 2 concentration of about 400
[ppm]." 78 Why this level? The report says that:
above the 2°C level, the risks of abrupt, accelerated, or runaway climate
change increase. The possibilities include reaching climatic tipping points
leading, for example, to the loss of the West Antarctic and Greenland ice
sheets (which, between them, could raise sea levels more than ten meters
over the space of a few centuries), the shutdown of the thermohaline ocean
circulation (and, with it, the Gulf Stream), and the transformation of the
planet's forests and soils from a net sink of carbon to a net source of
79
carbon.
It is surely correct that the probability of abrupt climate change increases as
the concentration of CO 2 rises, but we cannot be certain that the trigger point is
400 ppm. It may actually be higher or lower; we may already have passed the
trigger point and not yet experienced the effects, or the trigger point may not
exist. Making accurate projections even more complicated, rate of change must
be taken into account along with concentration level.8 0
Furthermore, to avert catastrophe, we can do more than limit
concentrations-we can adapt. Indeed, a recent scientific review of abrupt
climate change concluded that, "[g]iven the deep uncertainty about the nature
and speed of future climate changes, policy-making... might focus on reducing
77
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vulnerability of systems to1 impacts by enhancing ecological and societal
resiliency and adaptability."'
Concerns about abrupt climate change should tilt policy in the direction of
mitigation rather than adaptation, but mitigation will be costly and choice of a
concentration target must pay some attention to costs. 8 2 The International

Climate Change Task Force claims, without offering supporting evidence, that
"the cost of taking smart, effective action to meet the challenge of climate
change should be entirely manageable."8 3 But according to calculations by
William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, the costs of stabilizing concentrations at
twice the pre-industrial level-a level far higher than proposed by the Task
Force-would be about twice as great as the benefit.' Worries about abrupt
climate change would tilt the economic analysis in a direction more favorable to
the Task Force's recommended level, but it is difficult to ascertain by how much
since the information necessary for making this calculation does not exist.
Ignoring mitigation costs is ethically indefensible. Money expended on
mitigation cannot also be spent on economic development or adaptationinvestments that would reduce the vulnerability of economic and even ecological
systems to abrupt climate change.85 Furthermore, when viewed from a different
angle, climate mitigation measures also appear risky. It is inconceivable that
emissions will be reduced substantially in the short term without, among other
changes, expanding nuclear power capacity-a move that would introduce
different risks, including the risk that terrorists may obtain fissionable materials
or make the new facilities the target of a future attack. According to a recent
Massachusetts Institute of Technology report, the "current international
safeguards regime is inadequate
to meet the security challenges" of a substantial
86
expansion in nuclear energy.
From the perspective of individual countries, the calculus of choosing
between mitigation and adaptation is fundamentally different. Mitigation is a
global public good-to be precise, a summation public good, because changes in
the concentration level depend (among other things) on the aggregate level of
81
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emissions. Adaptation is different because it primarily benefits the countries that
undertake it. Sea walls, which protect territory behind the built defenses, are one
example of adaptation. From another example-the development and
application of new seed varieties that perform better in an altered climate-we
can more clearly see that most adaptation is a private good. There are thus
strong incentives for countries to undertake adaptation, but the incentives for
states to engage in mitigation are considerably weaker.
The Kyoto Protocol"7 was meant to commit countries to mitigation
measures, but it will have little or no effect. In fact, even if it worked as
intended, it would be largely inefficacious. The Kyoto Protocol only limits the
emissions of a relatively small number of countries for a short period of time
(from 2008 through 2012). It will not come close to capping concentrations at a
level anywhere near the one proposed by the Task Force."8
But the problems with this agreement run deeper. The most obvious one is
the decision by the US-the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases-not to
become a signatory. The United States's stance is not entirely due to the
inclinations of President George W. Bush. The US failed to participate (at least
in part) because the costs of its participation were likely to be high. Other
countries agreed to participate (at least in part) because the costs of participation
were relatively low for them. Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries
are not required to reduce their emissions, and they can thus participate at little
or no cost. While Canada and Japan, two major signatories to the Kyoto
Protocol, must reduce their emissions substantially, it is notable that they only
agreed to participate after their initial reduction obligations were diluted in a
subsequent agreement.89 The Kyoto Protocol entered into force because of
Russia's decision to ratify, but Russia only ratified the treaty after being given a
generous allowance of "hot air" emission entitlements and further concessions,
including a pledge by the European Union to support Russia's entry into the
World Trade Organization.90 Furthermore, the trading arrangements
87
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underpinning this agreement coupled with the surplus allowances given to
Russia and other "hot air" countries mean that some countries will be able to
avoid reducing emissions by paying other countries not to reduce their emissions.
These arrangements collectively suggest that the Kyoto Protocol may reduce
global emissions by very little, if at all-again, even if the agreement worked
precisely as intended.
However, there are already signs that the Kyoto Protocol may not work as
planned. The parties to this agreement may not comply-in fact, most of the
countries required to reduce emissions are currently not on course to meet their
targets. One notable example is Canada, whose own government reports that
Canadian emissions in 2010 will be about 45 percent above the country's Kyoto
target, assuming no reduction measures are taken-a figure that is "currently
being revised upwards." 91 What will happen in this case? One possibility is that
Canada will reach its target without utilizing the trading mechanism. However,
this seems unlikely because reducing emissions on such a vast scale would be
costly, and it would be hard for the Canadian government to convince Canadian
citizens that they should make sacrifices to mitigate emissions when their
neighbors in the US were not doing so, especially when the US is also Canada's
main trading partner. A second possibility is that Canada will meet its target by
buying allowances from countries with "hot air." This alternative also seems
unlikely because it would involve Canada avoiding its obligation to reduce
emissions by paying other countries with a surplus of allowances not to reduce
their emissions. Canadian citizens would likely not support a transaction that
gave away money without anything real being received in exchange. A final
possibility is that Canada will make a sincere but perhaps not wholly vigorous
effort to reduce emissions and will fail to meet its target. This scenario seems
most plausible. There is an agreed mechanism for enforcing compliance.
According to Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol, "any procedures and
mechanisms ... entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an
amendment to this Protocol. '92 However, no such amendment presently exists,
meaning that the Kyoto emission limits are more "political" than "legal."
These problems with the Kyoto Protocol reflect a fundamental
challenge-that of overcoming the free rider incentives associated with
supplying this global, summation public good. It is a much harder challenge than
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the ones that must be overcome in negotiating and sustaining a treaty on nearEarth objects or restrictions on germ line research.
The challenge does not derive entirely from the summation nature of
mitigation. Protection of the stratospheric ozone layer is also a global,
summation public good, and yet the treaty safeguarding the ozone layer-the
Montreal Protocol 93 -is a remarkable success. Indeed, it is another example of
an institution that averted global catastrophe; by some estimates, ozone
depletion would have killed hundreds of thousands if not millions of people if
no measures had been taken to prevent it.94 However, because of the Montreal
Protocol, the ozone layer is being protected to nearly the maximum extent
possible, and it is now expected to return to its original level by around 2050.
Why did the Montreal Protocol succeed where the Kyoto Protocol seems
to be failing? One reason is that the Montreal Protocol is simply a betterdesigned agreement. Another reason is that unchecked stratospheric ozone
depletion would have precipitated something of a catastrophe, thereby providing
countries with a strong incentive to take action to preserve the ozone layereven unilateral action if needed. This incentive was helped by yet another
advantage: the costs of protecting the ozone layer were found to be extremely
low relative to the benefits. As explained previously, the costs of climate change
mitigation are high even if the benefits are also substantial, and high costs make
free riding incentives hard to override.9"
VII. CONCLUSIONS
I do not know if the odds against our civilization surviving to the end of
this century are as large (small?) as predicted by Martin Rees, but I do know that
they are not given. They depend on whether we can develop and sustain
institutions that reduce the risks of global catastrophes.
This Article has endeavored to examine both the transnational incentive
problems associated with averting global catastrophes and the design of
institutions needed to solve these problems. The analysis could not be
comprehensive, but it covers a range of situations for which the incentives for
averting catastrophes vary markedly.
I have demonstrated that because incentives vary, the institutions needed
to change state behavior must also vary. I have also shown that some
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this book, I also propose an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol that should prove more effective
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catastrophes are easier to avert than are others. While sovereignty will not always
block the emergence of effective averting institutions, it may do so in some
cases. Addressing the most arduous challenges will require more fundamental
changes-changes that, as noted in the introduction, are perhaps unlikely to be
adopted this century. However, it is worth noting that the probability of a global
catastrophe increases over longer stretches of time (it is higher over a period of
five centuries than just one) and the international system will not remain
stagnant; it may evolve in time, or even in response to the need, to avert the
most challenging catastrophic risks. We cannot be sure that it will evolve in this
way, but therein will the prediction made by Rees, and predictions like it for the
more distant future, be decided.
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